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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
affecting his equitable remedies, and that the right, therefore, of
a mortgagee to a receiver for the preservation of his security, upon
proper cause shown, is in no manner impaired by such statute.
5. That if the mortgagor in possession or those deriving title
through him subsequent to the mortgage are permitting or committing waste of a character to impair the security, and the security is inadequate and those personally liable for the debt are insolvent, a proper case has been made out for the appointment
of a receiver to take charge of the property and to apply the rents
and profits, or so much thereof as may be necessary for that
purpose, in protecting it from preventable waste, this being, in
effect, a probable exception to Rein. C. S. 804 (P C. 7530)
6. That even though for proper cause shown, a receiver may be
appointed, the matter is entirely discretionary with the Court, and
that even though the mortgage stipulates otherwise, in no case
is a mortgagee entitled, as a matter of right, to the appointment.
In conclusion, it may be said that approval should be given to
that enlightened public policy which protects the home owner in
the possession of his home, but that there is little reason or justice
in extending that public policy for the purpose of enabling the
insolvent owner of an apartment house or other business property,
who has specifically pledged the rents and income as security for
his debt, to avoid his just obligation and pocket such rents and
income during the pendency of the foreclosure action.
J. C. PEARL.

RECENT CASES
INSURANCE-CONTEST

BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND MORTAGEES.

A owned

a tract of land with a dwelling on it, mortgaged to B for $950.00; dwelling insured for $800.00 and mortgage clause in favor of B was attached to
the policy- A, desiring to construct a store building on the land, negotiated a $1600.00 loan from C, B releasing his mortgage and taking a
2nd mortgage; C's mortgage provided A should keep the buildings on
the property insured for not less than $1600.00 for the benefit of C; C
held a $2000.00 policy on the store building; it was agreed between A
and C that the insurance on the dwelling should also be changed to make
same payable to C, but this was not done, and the dwelling burned. In
a contest between B and C: Held, that B was entitled to the entire
$800.00. Fireman'sFund Insurance Company v. Edward R. Smith, A. D.
Devonshire and Capital Savzngs & Loan Assn., 70 Wash. Dec. 201, 16 Pac.
2d 202 (1932).
An insurance policy is a personal contract between insurer and insured and does not pass with the property insured, Newark Fire Insurance
Co. v. Turk, 6 Fed. 2d 533, 43 A. L. R. 496 (CCA Penn. 1925) Fogg 'v.
Londorn & Promncal Marne & General Ins. Co., 237 Ky. 636, 36 S. W
2d 44 (1931) New York Underwriters V. Denson, 100 Okla. 89, 227 Pac.
124 (1924) Mercer v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 88 Or. 410, 171 Pac. 412
(1918). However, a contract between mortgagor (insured) and mortgagee whereby the former agrees to insure for the benefit of the latter
creates an equitable lien in favor of the mortgagee in the proceeds of
insurance on the property at the time of the contract or thereafter procured by the mortgagor, enabling the mortgagee to collect the
proceeds even in absence of any mortgage clause on the policy
In re Zitron, 203 Fed. 79 (D. C. Wisc. 1913) Stebbns v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 115 Wash. 623, 197 Pac. 913 (1921) 1st National Bank v.
Commerctal Union Assurance Co., 40 Idaho 236, 232 Pac. 899 (1925)
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Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 238 Ky.
229, 37 SW 2d 67 (1931) see Planters Bank v. Glove & Rutgers Fire Ins.
Co., 156 S. C. 453, 153 S. E. 385, 386 (1930). Accordingly, save as B's
interest as evidenced by his mortgage clause intervenes here, C could no
doubt recover the insurance proceeds.
The attachment of the so-called "standard" form of mortgage clause,
providing that as to the mortgagee the insurance shall not be invalidated
by acts of the mortgagor, creates a new contract between insurer and
mortgagee. Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Turk, 6 Fed. 2d 533, 43 A. L. R. 496
(CCA Penn. 1925) Burrows v. McCalley, 17 Wash. 269, 49 Pac. 508 (1897)
Oregon Mortgage Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 122 Wash. 183, 210 Pac.
385 (1922) Kimberley & Carpenter v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 157 Atl.
730 (Dela. 1931). The affect, however, of a simple loss payable clause,
is to make the mortgagee an appointee to receive payment and not a
party to the contract of insurance, mortgagee, in case of loss, taking
only such interest as the insured has, Inland Finance Co. v. Home Ins.
Co., 134 Wash. 485, 236 Pac. 73, 48 A. L. R. 121 (1925) Wyley v. Federal.
Ins. Co., 136 Wash. 686, 241 Pac. 292 (1925) Hill v. International Indemnity Co., 116 Kan. 109, 225 Pac. 1056 (1924) Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Bryan, 50 S. W 2d 74 (Ky. 1932). Under the standard clause, violation
of conditions of the policy by the insured mortgagor which would vitiate
the policy as to him do not defeat recovery by the mortgagee. It would
seem clear that no agreement between the mortgagor and a third party
could operate the cut off the mortgagee's rights under the contract between him and the insurer under the mortgage clause.
"Insurable interest" as defined by the courts Is such pecuniary Interest as will mean loss through destruction of the property and there
may be such interest even without a property right or lien in the subject
matter, Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 43
Idaho 222, 253 Pac. 379 (1927)
Tischendorf v. Lynn Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 190 Wisc. 33, 208 N. W 917, 45 A. L. R. 856 (1926) Wash.
Rem. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1922) Sec. 7033 defines insurable interest as
"Every interest in property or any relation thereto or liability in respect
thereof, of such a nature that a contemplated peril might directly damnify
the insured." Under this statute the Washington court has held contingent interests to be insurable interests, O'Neil v. Pacific States Fire
Ins. Co., 128 Wash. 133, 222 Pac. 215 (1924) (purchaser under contract
of sale) Hassett v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 150 Wash. 502, 273 Pac.
745 (1929), (assignor of car contract who guaranteed same).
In fact,
it is not questioned in the cases that the holder of a second mortgage
has an insurable interest in the encumbered property.
The mortgage to whom payment is to be made "as his interest may
appear" under a mortgage clause, need only to show existance of an
Interest at the time of the loss, Fenton v. Cascade Mutual Fire Assn, of
Wash., 60 Wash. 389, 111 Pac. 343 (1910)
Kimberley & Carpenter v.
National Liberty Ins. Co., 157 Atl. 730 (Dela. 1931) Walz v. Pennsnsular
Fire Ins. Co., 223 Mich. 399, 194 N. W 125 (1923). It would accordingly
appear immaterial that in the instant case B released his first mortgage
subsequent to attaching of the mortgage clause, and then took a second
mortgage. It has been held that the mortgagee whose interest is indicated on an attached mortgage clause can collect to the exclusion of
a prior mortgagee who interest is not so shown, where there were several mortgagees, Jeffreys v. Boston Ins. Co., 202 N. C. 368, 162 S. E. 761
(1932). The Louisiana court in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Landreneau,
19 La. App. 280, 140 So. 52 (1932) also held for the 2d mortgagee under
facts making out a stronger case for the 1st mortgagee than existed
in the Wash. case. (Policy issued after execution of the 2d mortgage,
court said that 1st mortgagee's equitable claim would not offset the
rights of the 2d mortgagee under his mortgage clause). The Washington
decision Is in accord with well settled principles of insurance law.
W L. S.
WA19BANTS-PAYMENT OF SArm ISSUED IN EXCESS OF STATUTORY POWER.
Plaintiff, treasurer of Spokane County, brought this action to restrain
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the county commissioners from issuing and selling bonds to pay the warrant indebtedness created for emergency indigent relief. Plaintiff contends that there was no authority to borrow the money by the issuance
of the bonds because of non-compliance with Rem. Comp. Stat., section
4086, since the warrants were issued for amounts greater than five hundred dollars. Plaintiff maintains that there is no need for issuing the
bonds to fund these warrants when the warrants are not valid obligations.
The court failed to pass on the validity of the warrants but held that
when the county received the money and applied it beneficially to an
authorized purpose, an action would lie to recover the money even though
the commissioners had not fully complied with statutory provisions in
obtaining the same. Inasmuch as the court holds that an action to recover
the money, it concludes that it would necessarily follow that the bond
issue for the purpose of taking care of the indebtedness would not be
defective or invalid, Paul J Kruesel v. Alvin H. Collin et al., 70 Wash.
Dec. 223, 16 Pac. (2) 442 (1932).
Where the public corporation has received the money for invalid
securities and has appropriated the same to some legitimate corporate
purpose, an action for money had and received, or for benefits received,
is the proper procedure for the recovery of the amount. Gilman v. Fern
aid, 141 Fed. 941, 72 C. 0. A. 675, (C. C. A. 8th, Iowa, 1905) Thomson v.
A number of the holdings
Elton, 109 Wis. 589, 85 N. W 425 (1901).
emphasize the necessity that the corporation shall not only receive the
money, but shall actually appropriate it to some purpose for which it had
power to contract an indebtedness. Chelsea Say. Bank v. Ironwood, 130
Fed. 410, 66 C. C. A. 230, (C. C. A. 6th Mich. 1904) Ironwood v. Wickes,
93 App. Div.. 164, 87 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1904) New Haven v. Weston, 87
Vt. 7, 86 At. 996, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 921 (1913).
Generally public corporations are restricted by statute or constitution
in their power to contract indebtedness. These restrictions, which are
set up for the protection of taxpayers from the unlawful acts of public
officers, which are not to be evaded directly or indirectly by enforcing
an implied obligation against the corporation. Where the invalidity of
the instrument is due to an essential lack of power to issue it, no implied promise will be raised against corporations. It is in these cases
where the enforcing of the implied liability would operate to defeat the
protective purpose of statutes prescribing a definite procedure to follow
to contract valid indebtedness. In instances such as this the prohibition
should be as effectual against the implied as the express promise if it
is worth anything at all. Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 29 L. Ed.
132, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820 (1885) McCurdy v. Shiawassee County, 154 Mich.
550, 118 N. W 625 (1908) Eaton v. Shtawassee County, 218 Fed. 588 (C.
C. A. 6th 1914) certiorari denied in 239 U. S. 647.
In a case somewhat analogous to the one at hand it was held that the
holder of warrants which were void because of failure to comply with
statutory requirements could still maintain action to recover the reasonable value of the equipment for which the warrants were given in payment, the invalidity of the obligation not being a defense to the implied
contract. Austin Bros. v. Montague County et al., - Tex. - 10 S. W (2)
718 (1928).
Even where county commissioners consented to entry of
judgment in favor of a holder of defective warrants, such entry of judgment was not held fraudulent, the court recognizing that the invalidity
of the warrants would be no defense to an action for money had and
received, as the validity of the underlying debt is the basis for determining whether the action should lie or not. Sweet et al. v. Denver - R. G. R.
Co., 59 Colo. 131, 147 Pac. 669 (1915).
To allow recovery in every instance where the statute is not complied
with in the issuance of instruments of indebtedness would be to indirectly
fritter away the safeguard step up by statute or constitution. However,
to admit liability on these warrants in the instant case in an action for
money had and received, even though the warrants in themselves might
not be enforceable, seems to be the only proper result where the money
was applied beneficially for a legitimate corporate purpose. Even though
it might appear on first glance that there should be no liability here be-
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cause of non-compliance with the statute, yet the object of the statute is
sill being carried out in that the public is not being forced to pay an
indebtedness which was unjustly created. The result seems much more
desirable than to insist on a strict construction of the statute which
might bar any action to recover the money.
P. M. G.
NEW TRiAL-NEWLY DISCOVERED EvIDENcE-PERsoNAL INJURIEs. The
plaintiff recovered $40,000 for injuries which would evidently be permanent. After this was affirmed in the Supreme Court, the defendant
petitioned the Supreme Court for permission to move for a new trial in
the lower court. This was supported by affidavits which showed that the
plaintiff had recovered from his injuries to a great extent. The plaintiff
presented counter-affidavits. There was no suggestion that any fraud had
been practiced on the court, but the petition was granted on the ground
that this was newly discovered evidence which the trial court should
consider. Whether or not the new trial should be granted was left to
the discretion of the trial court, with the provision that its inquiry
should be limited to the question of damages. Haaga v'. Saginaw Logging
Company, 70 Wash. Dec. 99, 15 Pac. (2d) 655 (1932).
The rule is well settled that a new trial will be granted if a plaintiff
recovers from his injuries so soon after trial that it is obvious that he
obtained a judgment by fraud. Wells, Fargo & Co. 1). Gunn, 33 Colo. 217,
79 Pac. 1029 (1905). If the plaintiff's condition improves because of facts
in existence at the time of the trial, which were not discovered by the
medical experts, a new trial will be granted, Anshultz v. Louisville By. Co.,
152 Ky. 741, 154 S. W 13, 45 L. R. A. N. S. 87 (1913) However, the instant
case does not fit into either of these classifications. Haaga's recovery
was due entirely to the healing processes of nature, and the new facts
were not in existence at the time of the trial.
There is some doubt whether the fact that an injury has healed is
newly discovered evidence at all. In a similar situation it has been held
that after developments, refuting an opinion as to fuutre probable results, cannot be classified as newly discovered evidence. Foge v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 53 Misc. 32, 130 N. Y. S. 977 (1907).
When there was no showing that a recovery from the injuries could
have been predicted if all the facts had been known at the time of the
trial, the courts have uniformly held that such recovery is not grounds
for a new trial. Gilson v. Washington Water Power Co., 93 Wash. 480,
161 Pac. 352 (1916) (evidence of recovery not conclusive) Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Reid, 6 Ga. App. 18, 63 S. E. 1130 (1909) National Concrete
Construction Co. 'v. Duvall, 153 Ky. 394, 155 S. W 757 (1913)
Cole v.
Fall Brook Coal Co., 57 Hun 585, 10 N. Y. S. 417 (1890) Brooks v. Rochester By. Co., 10 Misc. 88, 31 N. Y. S. 179 (1894).
The granting of a new trial is discretionary with the trial court, and
all these cases which have denied it are merely affirming the decisions
of the trial courts. Nevertheless, they announce the policy that the
verdict of a jury should not be disturbed unless it has been obtained by
fraud. The possibility of a recovery from the injuries is litigated at the
trial, and the jury's speculation as to the future should settle the matter
for all time. It is better that-injustice should be done in the individual
case than that litigation should be prolonged indefinitely. In view of
these considerations of policy, and the lack of authority to support its
position, the Washington court, although not granting a new trial in
the Instant case, would seem to have taken an untenable view :n allowing the trial court to consider this motion for a new trial.
G. V P
BANKS AND BANKING-TAKING OTHER THAN MONEY IN PAYMENT. The
State Treasurer issued a check, drawn on the Olympia National Bank and
payable to the First National Bank of Portland in payment of two state
warrants issued by the State Auditor to the plaintiff, who had authorized
their collection by the Portland Bank. The draft drawn on the First
National Bank of Seattle by the Olympia National Bank in payment of
the Treasurer's check was dishonored when presented for payment due
to lack of funds in the Seattle Bank to the credit of the Olympia National
Bank, which for the purposes of this decision was considered insolvent
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when the draft was drawn. The check being collected was returned
through the various collecting agencies to the Treasurer after the Olympia
National Bank failed. In this action the plaintiff was granted a writ of
mandate requiring the Treasurer to pay money out of the Treasury in
satisfaction of the original warrants on the theory that the Treasurer
was not released from liability on the original indebtedness in view of
Section 11 (1) of the Bank Collection Code, Chapter 203, Session Laws
of 1929, p. 518. The Supreme Court refused to recognize the Treasurer's
contention that Sec. 7 of the same act should defeat recovery State of
Washington ex. rel. Kern and Kibble v. Hinton as State Treasurer 68
Wash. Dec. 156, 10 Pac. (2d) 1115 (1932).
In rendering this decision, which is the first in which the Bank
Collection Code is cited, the Supreme Court faced the problem of interpreting two sections of the Bank Collection Code and applying this interpretation. The sections considered by the court provide:
Sec. 7. "Where the item is received by a solvent drawee or
payor bank, it shall be deemed paid when the amount is finally
charged to the account of the maker or drawer."
Sec. 11 and subsec. 1. "When an item is duly presented by
mail to the drawee or payor, whether or not the same has been
charged to the account of the maker or drawer thereof or returned to such maker or drawer, the agent collecting bank so
presenting may at its election, exercised with reasonable diligence, treat such item as dishonored by nonpayment and recourse
may be had upon prior parties thereto in any of following cases:
(1) Where the check or draft of the drawee or payor bank
upon another bank received in payment therefor shall not be paid
in due course;"
Section 11 (1) is designed to protect the payee and the collecting
bank when the check or draft accepted in payment of the item being
collected is not paid. In view of Sec. 7, which releases the the drawer
even though payment is not in cash, provided the drawee remits while
solvent, it is evident that Sec. 11 (1) binds the drawer, as a prior party,
only when the drawee bank remits by check or draft while insolvent .Sec.
7 properly limits the drawer's release from liability on an instrument as
a prior party when a draft is remitted in payment, to those cases in
which the drawee is solvent, since the drawer can not insist on payment
and release by an insolvent drawee. Since the drawee bank in this case
was insolvent when the remittance by draft was made, Sec. 11 (1) attaches
liability on the Treasurer, as a prior party without the qualification
contained in Sec. 7. The same result as that reached in this decision
is suggested as the proper remedy in 43 Harv. L. Rev. 307 (1929) and 7
N. C. L. Rev. 188 (1929)
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, it is questionable whether
our court would have reached the same result. In First Nat. Bank v.
Commercial Nat. Bank and T Co., 137 Wash. 335, 242 Pac. 356 (1926), the
generally accepted doctrine was recognized that if the payee of a check
or his agent, accepts from the drawee bank something else in place of
cash, as a draft on another bank or a deposit slip or credit, when the
drawee holds funds of the drawer sufficient to pay the check, and would
pay it in cash if demand were made, the transaction will be regarded
as a payment of the check and the drawer discharged. People ex. rel. Port
Chester Say. Bank v. Cromwell, 102 N. Y. 477, 7 N. E. 413 (1886) Federal
Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 31 A. L. R. 1261 (1924)
4 Wash.
Law Review 40 (1929) Texas Electric Service Co., v. Clark, 47 S. W (2d)
483 (Texas, 1932). Contra, Thomas v. Westchester County, 115 N. Y. 470, 21
N. E. 674, 4 L. R. A. 477 (1889) and Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co., 18 F
(2d) 711 (N. C., 1929) (result reached under statute allowing remittance
by draft). Cases collected in 52 A. L. R. 994.
Although the drawer of the item being collected was generally discharged even though payment was made by draft the position of the collecting agent was less secure. In First Nat. Bank v. Commercial Nat. Bank
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and T. Co., supra, the collecting agent was held liable for failure to collect m cash, while in Spokane Valley State Bank v. Lutes, 133 Wash. 66,
233 Pac. 308 (1925) the collecting agent was released from liability for
failure to collect in cash on the theory that a general custom to collect
other than in cash is impliedly included in the authority conferred
on the collecting bank acting as agent for the payee. See 61 A. L. R. 739.
It is evident that more confusion and uncertainty existed in the cases
dealing with the liability of the collecting agent than in the cases in
which the question of the drawer's discharge was involved. The Bank
Collection Code, sponsored by the American Bankers' Association seems
to be an attempt to resolve, in favor of the collecting agent, the uncertainty as to the collecting agent's liability. Its effect on the liability
of the drawer seems to be incidental to the main purpose of the act.
H. H.
MAIZCIOUS PROSECUTIoN-WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE. The defendants In
this case, a sheriff and his deputies, were informed by plaintiff's neighbors, and by Federal prohibition agents that plaintiff's premises were
being used for the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor. Defendants, without making an investigation, secured a search warrant from a
justice of the peace and raided the premises. A thorough and disturbing
search failed to reveal any evidenc of liquor law violations. Plaintiff
brought suit for malicious prosecution and recovered in the lower court.
The judgment was affirmed on appeal, the Supreme Court defining probable cause as evidence competent In a trial before a jury. Ladd v. Miles et
al., 70 Wash. Dec. 655 (1932).
The definition of probable cause in the present case of malicious prosecution is much more strict than that used by the great majority of
jurisdictions. Although there is some variation in the use of terms, the
usual requirement is a reasonable grounds of suspicion, supported by
circumstances strong enough in themselves to warrant a cautious man
in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
h is charged. Moore v. Durrer, (Cal) 16 Pac. (2d) 676 (1932) Schwartz
v. Schwartz, (Wis.) 240 N. W 177 (1932). Prior to the present case this
state was in accord. Warzng -v. Hudspeth, 75 Wash. 534, 135 Pac. 222
(1913), Borg, et al. v. Binghurst, 105 Wash. 521, 178 Pac. 450 (1919).
The test of probable cause now adopted by this state was first announced in Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208 (C. C. A. 1st 1922). The
case was one of first instance involving probable cause for search and
seizure under the National Prohibition Act to arise in that jurisdiction.
The court based its definition on the requirements for search warrants
under the Espionage Act, tit. 11 see. 5, the National Prohibition Act, sees.
25 and 33, and on the Fourth Amendment. The definition was subsequently used by the Federal Courts in Wagner v. United States, 8 Fed.
(2d) 581 (C. C. A. 8th 1925) Proulz v. United States, 32 Fed (2d) 760
(C. C. A. 1st 1929) and recently by the United States Supreme Court in
Grau v. United Sates, 53 Sup. Ct. 38 (1932).
It is interesting to note that the Federal cases cited above involved
illegal search of defendant's premises by prohibition agents, and further,
that the test of probable cause was used in connection with motions to
suppress evidence or quash indictments. Apparently the Federal Courts
have never applied the rule in any other type of case. Some state courts
hay gone nearly as far in liquor cases involving the same questions.
Wallace v. State, (Ind.) 157 N. E. 657 (1927)
People v. Soretsky, 343
Ill. 583, 175 N. E. 844 (1931).
Although the present public stand on prohibition may now be some
justification for the use of this test by the Federal Courts, its adoption
by this court, especially in view of the prior repeal of the state dry law,
seems a little late and difficult to justify. The court by applying this
definition of probable cause to the field of malicious prosecution, without
limiting it in any way, is undoubtedly taking a dangerous step. For
example, the query at once arises as to how this test would work in larceny cases, or in others which usually require immediate action. It is
needless to say that its unrestricted application there would soon discourage most criminal prosecutions and lead to a further breakdown of
law enforcement.
P. L.
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PLEADING-RES IPSA LOQUITUR. In an action for personal injuries, the
plaintiff alleged specific acts of negligence and yet relied on the doctrine
of res spsa loquitur Held: that such an allegation of specific acts of negligence does not deprive the plaintiff of the presumption of the doctrine
of res spsa loquitur Highland v. Wilsonzan Investment Co., 70 Wash. Dec.
647 (1932).
There are cases which hold that the plaintiff by merely alleging
specific acts of negligence precludes any right to rely upon the doctrine.
Orr v. Des Moines El. Light C., 222 N. W 560 (Iowa 1928) Federal Electric Co. v. Taylor 19 Fed. (2d) 122 (C. C. A. 8th 1927) Carpenter v. Burmeister 273 S. W 418 (Mo. 1925).
These courts take the view that the sole reason for the rule of res
zpsa loquitur is that in view of all the particular circumstances, the
plaintiff cannot be expected to know the particular negligent act causing
the injury, and therefore is permitted to reply upon the presumption
established by the doctrine of res spsa loquitur Therefore, when the
plaintiff alleges specific acts of negligence, he thereby admits that he
does know the particular acts causing the injury, and is thereby precluded from relying on the presumption established by the doctrine.
There are many cases that adopt the more liberal rule that allegations
of specific negligence m no way deprive the plaintiff of his right to
reply upon the doctrine of res zpsa loquitur if the case is otherwise a
proper one for its application. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas Co., 139 Atl.
440 (Vt. 1927) Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., 186 N. W 123 (Minn.
1921).
(For a discussion of both rules and citation of cases see "Pleading
Res Ipsa Loqutur," 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 415-433.)
The Supreme Court of Washington~has disapproved the strict rule and
has adopted the more liberal rule of pleading res ipsa loquitur In Walters v. Seattle R. & S. R. Co., 48 Wash. 238, 93 Pac. 420 (1908) it was held
that a passenger injured in collision of street cars who alleged in his complaint the particular cause of the accident was not deprived of the use
of the doctrine of res spsa loquitur The Walters case was approved in
Lobb v. Seattle R. & S. R. Co., 48 Wash. 238, 93 Pac. 420 (1908) This
view was reaffirmed in Kluska v. Yeomans, 54 Wash. 465, 103 Pac. 819
(1909) the court holding that a plaintiff does not lose the benefit of the
presumption of the doctrine of res zpsa loquitur because he has alleged
what he considered to be the specific cause of the accident. In Osborne
v. Charbneau, 148 Wash. 359, 268 Pac. 884 (1928), it might seem that a
contra result was reached, the court holding that the plaintiff by introducing evidence as to the specific cause of the accident thereby deprived
herself of the right to rely upon the presumption of the doctrine. However, it is questionable whether the Osborne case was a proper one for
the application of the doctrine of res zpsa loquitur
The instant case reaffirms the view taken in the Kluska case. namely,
that a plaintiff by alleging specific acts of negligence does not thereby
deprive himself of the right to rely on the presumption arising from
the doctrine of res zpsa loquitur Logically and consistently it would
seem that the liberal rule is incorrect, for it destroys the very principle
upon which the doctrine of res zpsa loquitur rests. The doctrine is founded
upon the theory that the plaintiff has knowledge of what caused his injury, and therefore is permitted to rely on the presumption that the
defendant was negligent. The plaintiff by alleging specific acts of negligence immediately negatives any such proposition and should thereby
be automatically precluded from relying on the presumption.
L. A. C.

